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Abstract
The ‘public sphere’ is one of the key concepts of the social theory produced
in the global North. But does the global South need this concept? Its theoretical
and cultural presuppositions are entirely European. They are not necessarily
universally valid, even when they purport to be general theories. If the
epistemological diversity of the world is to be accounted for, other theories
must be developed and anchored in other epistemologies – the epistemologies
of the South that adequately account for the realities of the global South. This
paper is a meta-theoretical critique of the concept of the public sphere from
the standpoint of the need for this epistemological diversity. It emphasises
the need for intercultural translation, understood as a procedure that allows
for mutual intelligibility among the diverse experiences of the world. Such a
procedure does not endow any set of experiences with the statute either of
exclusive totality or homogenous part.  In the African context, this work of
translation involves two moments. First, a deconstructive challenge which
consists in identifying the Eurocentric remains inherited from colonialism.
Secondly, a reconstructive challenge which consists in revitalising the historical
and cultural possibilities of the African legacy, interrupted by colonialism and
neocolonialism. In this twofold movement of social experiences relations of
mutual intelligibility emerge which must not result in the cannibalisation of
some by others.
Résumé
L’espace public est l’un des principaux concepts de la théorie sociale produite
dans le Nord. Mais est-ce que le Sud a besoin de ce concept ? Ses
présuppositions théoriques et culturelles qui sont entièrement européennes
ne sont pas toujours valables universellement, même si elles prétendent être
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des théories générales. La diversité épistémologique dans le monde est une
évidence. Par conséquent, d’autres théories doivent se baser sur d’autres
épistémologies. Tel doit être le cas des épistémologies du Sud qui doivent
adéquatement refléter les réalités du Sud. Cet article est donc une critique
métathéorique du concept d’espace public vu sous l’angle de la nécessité d’une
diversité épistémologique. Il met en relief la nécessité de la traduction
interculturelle qui doit être comprise comme étant la procédure qui permet
l’intelligibilité mutuelle des différentes expériences du monde. Une telle procédure
n’investit un statut de totalité exclusive ou d’homogénéité à aucun ensemble
d’expérience. Ce travail de traduction en Afrique implique deux moments.
Premièrement, le défi de la déconstruction qui consiste à identifier les vestiges
eurocentriques qui émanent du colonialisme. Deuxièmement, le défi de la
reconstruction qui consiste à revitaliser les possibilités historiques et culturelles
de l’héritage africain qui a été bouleversé par le colonialisme et le néocolonialisme.
C’est à travers ce mouvement à deux temps des expériences sociales qu’une
relation d’intelligibilité mutuelle va naître. Une relation qui ne devra pas résulter
sur la cannibalisation de l’un par l’autre.
Introduction
The concept of public sphere is one of the key (and most widely debated)
concepts of the most elaborate and monumental social theory produced in
the second half of the twentieth century in the global North, the social
theory of the world-renowned German philosopher, Jürgen Habermas. It is
not my purpose to engage here in a detailed analysis of the concept.1 I rather
intend to lay out the ground upon which the following question may be
answered: Does the global South need the concept of public sphere?
Why this question? The concept of public sphere reflects, in a stylised
way, the political practices of the European bourgeoisie at the beginning of
the eighteenth century. It expresses the emergence of the bourgeois citizen
as a political actor through practices and institutions (coffeehouses, salons,
newspapers, clubs, etc.) that mediate between the private sphere of civil
society (family and the economy) and state political authority.  Accordingly,
its theoretical and cultural presuppositions are entirely European: it is based
on the individual bourgeois and life experience; it assumes the separation
between the state and civil society; it sees the bourgeois citizen and his
public sphere as external to the structure of power; it takes for granted its
informal and equal inclusiveness (which, as Habermas himself later
recognised, concealed flagrant exclusions, such as women, workers and
non-proprietors in general); its dynamic component is the reasonable
discussion and a culturally shared discourse (reasonable arguments and
counter-arguments, recognised as such by the participants) through which
a consensus is reached on matters of common concern; political action
consists of political discussion, not political action and transformation. These
presuppositions are today highly problematical, even in the global North.
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What about the global South?  Do other presuppositions present in the glo-
bal South require other concepts? How much political reality is left out or
made invisible by the concept of public sphere? On the other hand, is it not
true that some of these presuppositions are also present in some other
Eurocentric concepts with wide usage in the global South, such as democ-
racy and human rights? Can the limitations of Eurocentric origin be super-
seded by theoretical and political reconstruction? At what cost? Assuming
that the public sphere has become a hegemonic concept, is it possible to use
it in a counter-hegemonic way?
There are, therefore, good reasons to ask: does the global South need
the concept of public sphere? This question implies three other questions. If
we answer in the affirmative, is the problem of the eventual inadequacy of
the concept vis-à-vis the realities prevailing in the global South to be solved
by adjectivising or qualifying the concept? If the answer is negative, which
epistemological procedures should be undertaken to allow for the development
of other concepts that might be both more adequate to the realities of the
global South and helpful in designing post-imperialistic, truly decolonised
relationships between the global North and the global South? More generally,
which are the main issues concerning the relationship between theory and
practice in our time?
These questions suggest that the social theories produced in the global
North are not necessarily universally valid, even when they purport to be
general theories. Moreover, they suggest that a hermeneutics of suspicion is
recommended vis-à-vis such theories, if the epistemological diversity of
the world is to be accounted for. At this point, to account for such diversity
involves the recognition that the theories produced in the global North are
best equipped to account for the social, political and cultural realities of the
global North and that in order adequately to account for the realities of the
global South other theories must be developed and anchored in other
epistemologies – the epistemologies of the South.2
The West, or global North, claims the right to the dominant view of the
world.3 But, on the other hand, the global South is entitled to have its own
view of the world (and of the global North). It should come as no surprise
that between these two views the differences are so vast that they seem to
refer to different worlds. Herein lies the distance this article argues for vis-
à-vis Eurocentric or West-centric social theories, including critical social
theories. Such distance opens up the epistemological and theoretical ground
upon which new analytical possibilities may develop as more attuned to the
political needs of radical social transformation, that is to say, to a social
transformation that puts an end to the unequal divide between the global
North and the global South.
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Keeping a Distance vis-à-vis Western Eurocentric Theoretical
Tradition
Keeping distance does not mean dumping all this rich tradition into the dustbin
of history, let alone ignoring the historical possibilities for social emancipation
of Western modernity. It means assuming our time as a time displaying an
unprecedented, transitional feature which we may formulate in the following
way: we have modern problems for which there are no modern solutions.
The modern problems of equality, liberty and fraternity are still with us.
However, the modern solutions proposed by liberalism as well as Marxism
no longer work, even if pushed to its possible maximum consciousness (to
use Lucien Goldmann’s phrase),4 as is the case of Habermas’ magisterial
intellectual reconstruction of Western modernity.5 The limits of such a
reconstruction are inscribed in the dominant version of modernity from
which Habermas takes off, and which is, actually, a second modernity
developed from the first one, the Iberian modernity of the Coimbra scholars
in the sixteenth century6 What characterises the second modernity and renders
it predominant is the abyssal line it traces between metropolitan societies
(Europe) and colonial societies.7 This abyssal line traverses Habermas’s
thinking in its entirety and is therefore also relevant for the concept of public
sphere. His extraordinary lucidity allows him to see it but not to overcome
it. His theory of communicative action, as a new model of discursive
rationality, is well known.8 According to Habermas, this theory constitutes a
telos of development for all humanity and that with it, it is possible to refuse
both relativism and eclecticism. However, once asked if his theory,
particularly his critical theory of advanced capitalism, could be useful to the
progressive forces of the Third World, and if such forces could be useful to
the struggles of democratic socialism in developed countries, Habermas
(1984) begged not to answer: ‘I am inclined to reply "no" in both cases. I
am aware that mine is a limited and Eurocentric vision. I would rather not
answer’.9 Such response implies that Habermas’ communicative rationality,
in spite of its resounding universality, actually excludes four fifths of the
world population. This exclusion is declared in the name of inclusion/
exclusion criteria whose legitimacy resides in their supposed universality. In
this way, exclusion may be declared simultaneously with extreme honesty
(‘I am aware that mine is a limited and Eurocentric vision’) and extreme
blindness vis-à-vis its non-sustainability (or, to be fair, the blindness is not
total, considering Habermas’ strategic way out (‘I would rather not answer’).
Thus, Habermas’ universalism turns out to be a benevolent but imperialist
universalism, for it fully controls decisions concerning its own limitations,
imposing on itself, with no other limits, what it includes and excludes.10
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Beyond the dominant ones, other versions of modernity were marginalised
for questioning the triumphalist certainties of the Christian faith and modern
science and law, which both produced the abyssal line and rendered it
invisible. I have in mind, for instance, Nicholas of Cusa and Pascal, who
(together with other, equally forgotten thinkers) keep alive still today the
possibility of a non-occidentalist West.11 Keeping distance vis-à-vis the
dominant versions of Western modernity thus entails getting closer to
subaltern, silenced, marginalised versions of modernity and rationality, both
Western and non-Western.
Keeping distance means, therefore, placing oneself simultaneously inside
and outside what one critiques, and thus making possible what I call the
doubly transgressive sociology of absences and emergences. This
‘transgressive sociology’ is actually an epistemological demarche consisting
in opposing the dominant epistemologies of the global North with an
epistemology of the South in the sense specified below. In the following
sections, I mention two good reasons to keep a distance from Eurocentric
critical theory: the loss of critical nouns and the phantasmal relationship
between theory and action.
The Loss of Critical Nouns
There was a time when critical theory ‘owned’ an ample set of nouns to
distinguish itself from conventional, bourgeois theories. Among them,
socialism, communism, dependency, class struggle, alienation, participation,
popular front, and so on and so forth. For the last 30 years, the Eurocentric
tradition has been identified by the adjectives with which it qualifies the
proper nouns of conventional theories. Thus, for instance, if conventional
theory speaks of development, critical theory refers to alternative, democratic
or sustainable development; if conventional theory speaks of democracy,
critical theory propounds radical, participative or deliberative democracy;
the same is true of cosmopolitism, which is then qualified as subaltern, of
opposition or insurgent, or rooted; the same regarding human rights, which
turn out to be radical, collective, intercultural. These changes, however,
must be taken with caution.
Hegemonic (substantive) concepts are not, on the pragmatic level, the
unalienable property of conventional or liberal thinking. One of the dimensions
of the present context is precisely the ability of social movements to use
hegemonic tools in a counter-hegemonic way and with counter-hegemonic
ends in view.12 The truth is that nouns continue to establish the intellectual
and political horizon, defining not only what is sayable, credible, legitimate
or realistic, but also, by implication, what is unsayable, incredible or
unrealistic. That is to say, by resorting to adjectives, theory assumes it can
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creatively take advantage of nouns, while agreeing, at the same time, to limit
its debates and proposals to what is possible within a horizon of possibilities
which is originally not its own. Critical theory, therefore, takes on a derivative
character which allows it to engage in debate but not to discuss the terms of
the debate, let alone explain why it opts for one kind of debate and not
another. The efficacy of the counter-hegemonic use of hegemonic concepts
or tools is defined by the consciousness of the limits of such use.
Such limits are now more visible as social struggles aim to resemanticise
old concepts, while, at the same time, introducing new concepts without
precedent in Eurocentric theory, if for nothing else, because they express
themselves in languages other than the colonial ones in which it was first
constructed. Being particularly evident in Latin America through the recent
protagonism of the indigenous peoples’ struggles, this also occurs in other
continents. It does not seem to me, therefore, that the ‘problem’ of bringing
the concept of the public sphere to bear on the political concerns of non-
Eurocentric conceptions of social emancipation might be solved by a new
set of adjectives, be they subaltern, plebeian, oppositional, or counter-
insurgent public sphere.
The Phantasmal Relation between Theory and Practice
A second reason to keep a distance vis-à-vis Eurocentric critical tradition
concerns the huge discrepancy between what the theory anticipates and the
transformative practices going on in the world. For the last 30 years the
most progressive struggles featured social groups (indigenous, peasant,
women, afro-descendents, miners, unemployed) whose role in history was
not foreseen by Eurocentric critical theory. They often organised themselves
in ways other than according to the party or unions, as allowed by the
theory (social movements, grassroots communities, pickets, self-government,
popular economic organisations). They do not dwell in urban, industrial
centres but rather in far away Andean heights, in Amazonic planes, by the
River Narmada in India, or in the African hinterland or urban suburbs.  They
often speak their struggles in their national languages rather than in any of
the colonial languages in which critical theory was written. When their claims
and aspirations are translated into colonial languages, the usual terms of
socialism, human rights, democracy and development give way to dignity,
respect, territory, self-government, good life, mother earth.
  This discrepancy between theory and practice was highly visible in the
World Social Forum (WSF) which took place for the first time in Porto
Alegre in 2001. The WSF has shown that the gap between the practices of
the left and the classical theories was wider than ever. The WSF is not an
isolated phenomenon, as proven by the political experiences of Latin America,
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where the WSF emerged. Just think of the Zapatist movement in Chiapas
(Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional/EZLN);  the Argentine piqueteros
and the movement of the landless in Brazil (MST);  the indigenous movements
in Bolivia and Ecuador; the Frente Amplio in Uruguay; the many victories of
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela; the election of  Evo Morales in Bolivia,  Fernando
Lugo in Paraguay and José Mujica in Uruguay; the continental struggle against
ALCA;13 the project of alternative regional integration championed by Hugo
Chávez (ALBA).14 All these are political practices that cannot but be
acknowledged as emancipatory, although they have not been foreseen by
the great theoretical tradition of the Eurocentric left and may actually
contradict it. As an international event and meeting point of so many practices
of resistance and alternative projects, the World Social Forum has given a
new dimension to this mutual blindness (of theory vis-à-vis practice, and of
practice vis-à-vis theory), while creating the conditions for a broader and
deeper reflection on this problem.
The blindness of theory entails the invisibility of the practice, and hence
its sub-theorisation, while the blindness of practice entails the irrelevancy of
the theory. The blindness of the theory may be observed in the way in
which the conventional left parties, and their intellectuals, refused at first to
pay attention to the WSF, or minimised its relevance. The blindness of the
practice, in turn, manifests itself in the contempt of the great majority of the
WSF activists for the rich theoretical tradition of the Eurocentric left and
their utter scorn regarding its renovation. This mutual mismatch brings about,
in practice, an extreme oscillation between revolutionary, or pseudo-
revolutionary, spontaneity and an innocuous, self-censored action;  as well
as, in theory, an equally extreme oscillation between a post factum,
reconstructive concern and an arrogant indifference about what is not
included in such reconstruction.
Under these conditions, the relation between theory and practice assumes
strange characteristics. On the one hand, theory is no longer at the service
of the future practices it potentially contains, and serves, rather, to legitimise
(or not) the past practices that have emerged in spite of itself. Theory stops
being orientation to become ratification of the successes obtained by omission
or confirmation of foreseen failures. On the other hand, practice justifies
itself by resorting to a theoretical potpourri focused on the topical needs of
the moment, made up of heterogeneous concepts and languages which,
from the point of view of theory, are no more than opportunist rationalisations
or rhetorical exercises. In a nutshell, the phantasmal relation between theory
and practice can be formulated in this way: from the point of view of theory,
theoretical bricolage never qualifies as theory; from the point of view of
practice, a posteriori theorisation is mere parasitism.
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The causes of this phantasmal relation between theory and practice are
multiple, but the most important one is that, while Eurocentric critical theory
was constructed in several European countries (Germany, England, France,
Russia, and Italy) in order to influence the progressive struggles in that part
of the world, in recent times, the most innovative and transformative struggles
have been occurring in the South in the context of very distinct socio-
politico-cultural realities. It goes without saying that the phantasmal distance
between theory and practice is not merely the result of context differences.
It is a far more epistemological, if not ontological distance. Way beyond
context, the movements in different continents construct their struggles on
the basis of ancestral, popular and spiritual knowledge that has always been
alien to Eurocentric critical theory. Moreover, their ontological conceptions
of being and living are quite distinct from Western individualism. Human
beings are communities of beings rather than individuals; in their
communities, the ancestors are present, as well as animals and mother earth.
We are confronted with non-Western world visions which call for
intercultural translation before they can be understood and appreciated.
In his brilliant survey of the progressive history of the Latin American
continent and, especially, the various subversive and emancipatory
‘conceptions of the world’ that have dominated Bolivia for the past few
years, Alvaro García Linera eloquently explains how the ‘modernist and
teleological narrative’ of history at a certain point became a theoretical
blindness and an epistemological blockage vis-à-vis the new emancipatory
movements. Here is García Linera:
This modernist and teleological narrative of history, largely adopted from manuals
of economics and philosophy, will create a cognitive blockage and an
epistemological impossibility concerning two realities that will be the starting
point of another emancipatory project which in time will overcome Marxist
ideology itself. I mean the nation’s ethnic and peasant themes (2009:482).
The loss of critical nouns, together with the phantasmal relation between
Eurocentric critical theory and the transformative struggles in the world,
not only recommends some distance vis-à-vis previous critical thinking;
more than that, they demand thinking the unthinkable, that is to say, adopting
surprise as a constitutive act of the theoretical work. Now, since, by
definition, avant-garde theories are not taken by surprise, I believe that what
we need in the present context of social and political change is not avant-
garde, but rather rearguard theories. I mean theoretical work that goes hand
in hand with the transformative work of the social movements, putting it in
question, establishing synchronic and diachronic comparisons, and
symbolically enlarging its dimension by means of articulations, translations,
4. Santos.pmd 06/03/2012, 18:3450
51Santos: Public Sphere and Epistemologies of the South
and alliances with other movements. It calls for artisanal rather than archi-
tectural work, work of committed witnessing rather than clairvoyant lead-
ership, accessing what is new for some and very old for other people.
In light of the preceding discussion, I propose a debate on whether the
concept of public sphere is part of the solution or part of the problem when
we face the phantasmal relation between theory and practice, that is, whether
the concept creates more transparency between theory and practice or
whether, on the contrary, it reinforces the phantasmal relation. I dare to
think that the latter is the case. If so, the task ahead consists in laying out
the epistemological ground for the emergence of new theoretical possibilities.
The Construction of an Epistemology of the South
By epistemology of the South I mean the retrieval of new processes of
production and valorisation of valid knowledges, whether scientific or non-
scientific, and of new relations among different types of knowledge on the
basis of the practices of the classes and social groups that have suffered, in
a systematic way, the oppression and discrimination caused by capitalism
and colonialism. The global South is thus not a geographical concept, even
though the great majority of these populations live in countries of the Southern
hemisphere. The South is here rather a metaphor of the human suffering
caused by capitalism and colonialism at the global level, and a metaphor as
well of the resistance to overcome or minimise such suffering. It is,
therefore, an anticapitalist, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist South. It is a
South that also exists in the global North,15 in the form of excluded, silenced
and marginalised populations, such as undocumented immigrants, the
unemployed, ethnic or religious minorities, and victims of sexism, homophobia
and racism.
The two premises of an epistemology of the South are as follows.16 First,
the understanding of the world is much broader than the Western understanding
of the world. This means that the progressive change of the world may also
occur in ways not foreseen by Western thinking, including critical Western
thinking (Marxism not excluded). Second, the diversity of the world is infinite.
It is a diversity that encompasses very distinct modes of being, thinking and
feeling, ways of conceiving of time and the relation among human beings
and between humans and non-humans, ways of facing the past and the
future and of collectively organising life, the production of goods and services,
as well as leisure. This immensity of alternatives of life, conviviality and
interaction with the world is largely wasted because the theories and concepts
developed in the global North and employed in the entire academic world do
not identify such alternatives. When they do, they do not valorise them as
being valid contributions towards constructing a better society. To my mind,
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therefore, we do not need alternatives; we need rather an alternative thinking
of alternatives. The construction of epistemologies of the South must be
built by four steps: sociology of absences, sociology of emergences, ecology
of knowledges, intercultural translation.
Sociology of Absences
By sociology of absences I mean research that aims to show that what does
not exist is actually actively produced as non-existent, that is to say, as an
unbelievable alternative to what exists. Its empirical object is impossible
from the point of view of conventional social sciences. Impossible objects
must be turned into possible objects, absent objects into present objects.
Non-existence is produced whenever a certain entity is discredited and
considered invisible, non-intelligible or discardable. Thus there is no sole,
rather several ways to produce absences. What is common to them is the
same monocultural rationality. I distinguish five logics behind four modes
of production of absence or non-existence: ignorant, backward, inferior,
local or particular, and unproductive or sterile.17
The first logic derives from the ‘monoculture of knowledge’ and ‘rigour
of knowledge’. It is the most powerful mode of production of non-existence.
It consists in turning modern science and high culture into the sole criteria
of truth and aesthetic quality, respectively. The complicity that unites the
‘two cultures’ resides in the fact that both claim to be, each in its own field,
exclusive canons of production of knowledge or artistic creation. All that is
not recognised or legitimised by the canon is declared non-existent. Non-
existence appears in this case in the form of ignorance or lack of culture.
The second logic resides in the ‘monoculture of linear time’, the idea
that history has a unique and well known meaning and direction. This meaning
and direction have been formulated in different ways in the last two hundred
years: progress, revolution, modernisation, development, and globalisation.
Common to all these formulations is the idea that time is linear and that at
the cutting edge of time are to be found the core countries of the world
system and, along with them, the dominant knowledges, institutions and
forms of sociability. This logic produces non-existence by describing as
backward whatever is asymmetrical vis-à-vis whatever is declared forward.
It is according to this logic that Western modernity produces the non-
contemporaneity of the contemporaneous, and that the idea of simultaneity
conceals the asymmetries of the historical times that converge into it. The
encounter between the African peasant and the officer of the World Bank in
his field trip illustrates this condition. They meet simultaneously but are not
considered contemporaneous. In this case, non-existence assumes the form
of residuum, which in turn has assumed many designations for the past 200
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years, the first being the primitive, closely followed by the traditional, the
premodern, the simple, the obsolete, the underdeveloped.
The third logic is the logic of social classification, based on the monoculture
of ‘naturalisation of differences’. It consists in distributing populations
according to categories that naturalise hierarchies. Racial and sexual
classifications are the most salient manifestations of this logic. Contrary to
what happens in the relation between capital and labour, social classification
is based on attributes that negate the intentionality of social hierarchy. The
relation of domination is the consequence, rather than the cause, of this
hierarchy, and it may even be considered as an obligation of whoever is
classified as superior (for example, the white man’s burden in his civilising
mission). Although the two forms of classification (race and sex) are decisive
for the relation between capital and labour to stabilise and spread globally,
racial classification was the one most deeply reconstructed by capitalism,
as Wallerstein and Balibar (1991) have shown, and, even more acutely, Césaire
(1955), Quijano (2000), Mignolo (2000), Dussel (2001), Maldonado-Torres
(2004) and Grosfoguel (2007).18 According to this logic, non-existence is
produced as a form of inferiority, insuperable inferiority because natural.
The inferior ones, because insuperably inferior, cannot be a credible alternative
to the superior ones.
The fourth logic of production of non-existence is the ‘logic of the
dominant scale’. According to this logic, the scale adopted as primordial
determines the irrelevance of all other possible scales. In Western modernity,
the dominant scale appears under two different forms: the universal and the
global. Universalism is the scale of the entities or realities that prevail
regardless of specific contexts. For that reason, they take precedence over
all other realities that depend on contexts and are therefore considered
particular or vernacular. Globalisation is the scale that in the last 20 years
acquired unprecedented relevance in various social fields. It is the scale that
grants privileges to entities or realities that widen their scope to the whole
globe, thus earning the prerogative to designate rival entities as local. According
to this logic, non-existence is produced under the form of the particular and
the local. The entities or realities defined as particular or local are captured
in scales that render them incapable of being credible alternatives to what
exists globally and universally.
Finally, the fifth logic of non-existence is the ‘logic of productivity’. It
resides in the monoculture of the criteria of capitalist productivity. According
to this logic, economic growth is an unquestionable rational objective. As
such, the criterion of productivity that best serves this objective is
unquestionable as well. This criterion applies both to nature and to human
labour. Productive nature is nature at its maximum fertility in a given
4. Santos.pmd 06/03/2012, 18:3453
54 Africa Development, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, 2012
production cycle, whereas productive labour is labour that maximises gen-
erating profit likewise in a given production cycle. According to this logic,
non-existence is produced in the form of non-productiveness. Applied to
nature, non-productiveness is sterility; applied to labour, sloth or profes-
sional disqualification.
There are thus five principal social forms of non-existence produced by
metonymic reason: the ignorant, the residual, the inferior, the local, and the
non-productive. They are social forms of non-existence because the realities
to which they give shape are present only as obstacles vis-à-vis the realities
deemed relevant, be they scientific, advanced, superior, global or productive
realities. They are, therefore, disqualified parts of homogeneous totalities
which, as such, merely confirm what exists and precisely as it exists. They
are what exists under irretrievably disqualified forms of existing.
Sociology of Emergences
The sociology of emergences consists in replacing the emptiness of the
future according to linear time (an emptiness that may be all or nothing) by
a future of plural and concrete possibilities, utopian and realist at one time,
and constructed in the present by means of activities of care.
To deal with emergences implies speculativeness, and thus requires some
philosophical elaboration. The profound meaning of emergences can be
grasped in many different cultural and philosophical traditions. As regards
Western philosophy, emergences are a marginal topic, best dealt with by
Ernst Bloch. The concept that rules the sociology of emergences is the
concept of Not Yet (Noch Nicht) advanced by Ernst Bloch (1995). Bloch
takes issue with the fact that Western philosophy was dominated by the
concepts of All (Alles) and Nothing (Nichts), in which everything seems to
be contained in latency, but from whence nothing new can emerge. Western
philosophy is, therefore, a static philosophy. For Bloch, the possible is the
most uncertain and the most ignored concept in Western philosophy
(1995:241). Yet, only the possible permits to reveal the inexhaustible wealth
of the world. Besides All and Nothing, Bloch introduces two new concepts:
Not (Nicht) and Not Yet (Noch Nicht). The Not is the lack of something and
the expression of the will to surmount that lack. The Not is thus distinguished
from the Nothing (1995:306). To say No is to say yes to something different.
The Not Yet is the more complex category because it expresses what exists
as mere tendency, a movement that is latent in the very process of manifesting
itself. The Not Yet is the way in which the future is inscribed in the present.
It is not an indeterminate or infinite future, but rather a concrete possibility
and a capacity that neither exists in a vacuum nor is completely predetermined.
Indeed, they actively re-determine all they touch, thus questioning the
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determinations that exist at a given moment. Subjectively, the Not Yet is
anticipatory consciousness, a form of consciousness that, although extremely
important in people’s lives, was completely neglected by Freud (Bloch
1995:286-315). Objectively, the Not Yet is, on the one hand, capacity (potency)
and, on the other, possibility (potentiality). Possibility has a dimension of
darkness as it originates in the lived moment, which is never fully visible to
itself, as well as a component of uncertainty that derives from a double
want: 1) the fact that the conditions that render possibility concrete are only
partially known; 2) the fact that the conditions only exist partially. For Bloch,
it is crucial to distinguish between these two wants: it is possible to know
relatively well conditions that exist only very partially, and vice-versa.
The Not Yet inscribes in the present a possibility that is uncertain, but
never neutral; it could be the possibility of utopia or salvation (heil) or the
possibility of catastrophe or damnation (unheil). Such uncertainty brings an
element of chance, or danger, to every change. This uncertainty is what, to
my mind, expands the present, while at the same time contracting the future
and rendering it the object of care. At every moment, there is a limited
horizon of possibilities, and that is why it is important not to waste the
unique opportunity of a specific change offered by the present: carpe diem
(seize the day). In accord with Marxism, which he in any case interpreted
in a very creative way, Bloch thinks that the succession of horizons leads or
tends toward a final state. I believe, however, that not agreeing with Bloch
in this regard is not relevant. Bloch’s emphasis stresses the critique of the
mechanical conception of matter, on the one hand, and the affirmation of
our capacity to think and act productively upon the world, on the other.
Considering the three modal categories of existence – reality, necessity, and
possibility (Bloch 1995:244-245) – lazy reason focused on the first two and
neglected the third one entirely.
According to Bloch, Hegel is mainly responsible for the fact that the
possible has been neglected by philosophy. According to Hegel, because the
possible is contained in the real, either it does not exist or is not different
from what exists. In any case, it need not be thought of. Reality and necessity
have no need of possibility to account for the present or future. Modern
science was the privileged vehicle of this conception. For this reason, Bloch
invites us to focus on the modal category that has been most neglected by
modern science: possibility. To be human is to have a lot ahead of you
(1995:246). Possibility is the world’s engine. Its moments are: ‘want’ (the
manifestation of something lacking), ‘tendency’ (process and meaning),
and ‘latency’ (what goes ahead in the process). Want is the realm of the
Not, tendency the realm of the Not Yet, and latency the realm of the Nothing
and the All, for latency can end up either in frustration or hope.
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The sociology of emergences is the inquiry into the alternatives that are
contained in the horizon of concrete possibilities. Whereas the sociology of
absences amplifies the present by adding to the existing reality what was
subtracted from it by metonymic reason, the sociology of emergences
enlarges the present by adding to the existing reality the possibilities and
future expectations it contains. In the latter case, the enlargement of the
present implies the contraction of the future inasmuch as the Not Yet, far
from being an empty and infinite future, is a concrete future, forever uncertain
and in danger. As Bloch says, by every hope, there is always a coffin
(1995:311). Caring for the future is imperative because it is impossible to
armour hope against frustration, the advent against nihilism, redemption
against disaster. In a word, it is impossible to have hope without the coffin.
The sociology of emergences consists in undertaking a symbolic
enlargement of knowledges, practices and agents in order to identify therein
the tendencies of the future (the Not Yet) upon which it is possible to intervene
so as to maximise the probability of hope vis-à-vis the probability of
frustration. Such symbolic enlargement is actually a form of sociological
imagination with a double aim: on the one hand, to know better the conditions
of the possibility of hope; on the other, to define principles of action to
promote the fulfillment of those conditions.
The sociology of emergences acts both on possibilities (potentiality) and
on capacities (potency). The Not Yet has meaning (as possibility), but no
direction, for it can end either in hope or disaster. Therefore, the sociology
of emergences replaces the idea of determination by the idea of care. The
axiology of progress is thus replaced by the axiology of care. Whereas in
the sociology of absences the axiology of care is exerted vis-à-vis available
alternatives, in the sociology of emergences the axiology of care is exerted
vis-à-vis possible alternatives. Because of this ethical dimension, neither the
sociology of absences nor the sociology of emergences are conventional
sociologies. But they are not conventional for another reason: their objectivity
depends upon the quality of their subjective dimension. The subjective element
of the sociology of absences is cosmopolitan consciousness and non-
conformism before the waste of experience. The subjective element of the
sociology of emergences is anticipatory consciousness and non-conformism
before a want whose fulfillment is within the horizon of possibilities. As
Bloch says, the fundamental concepts are not reachable without a theory of
the emotions (1995:306). The Not, the Nothing, and the All shed light on
such basic emotions as hunger or want, despair or annihilation, trust or
redemption. One way or another, these emotions are present in the non-
conformism that moves both the sociology of absences and the sociology
of emergences.
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Ecology of Knowledges
The third core idea of the epistemology of the South is the ecology of
knowledges.19 The ecology of knowledges is founded on the idea that there
is no ignorance or knowledge in general; every kind of ignorance ignores a
certain kind of knowledge and every kind of knowledge triumphs over a
particular kind of ignorance.20 Learning some kinds of knowledges may
imply forgetting others and ultimately ignoring them. In other words,
concerning the ecology of knowledges, ignorance is not necessarily the
original condition or starting point; it may well be the point of arrival. That
is why throughout every stage of the ecology of knowledges it is crucial to
ask if what is being learnt is valuable, or should be forgotten or not learnt.
Ignorance is merely a discredited form of being and making when what has
been learnt is more valuable than what is being forgotten. The utopia of
inter-knowledge is learning other knowledges without forgetting one’s own.
Such is the idea of prudence underlying the ecology of knowledges.
The ecology of knowledges starts with the assumption that all practices
of relations among human beings, as well as between human beings and
nature, imply more than one form of knowledge, hence also of ignorance.
Epistemologically, modern capitalist society is characterised by the fact that
it favours practices in which scientific knowledge prevails. This privileged
‘status’ granted to scientific practices means that their interventions in human
and natural reality are also privileged. Any crisis or catastrophe resulting
from such practices is socially acceptable and counted as inevitable social
cost that can be overcome by new scientific practices.
Since scientific knowledge is not socially distributed with proper
proportion, the interventions in the world it favours tend to concern social
groups with access to scientific knowledge.  Social injustice is grounded in
cognitive injustice. However, the struggle for cognitive justice will not be
successful if it depends only on the idea of a more balanced distribution of
scientific knowledge. Besides the fact that a balanced distribution is impossible
under the conditions of global capitalism, this kind of knowledge has intrinsic
limits regarding the kinds of possible intervention in the real world. Such
limits are the result of scientific ignorance and inability to recognise alternative
forms of knowledge and engage with them in terms of equality. Under the
ecology of knowledges, granting credibility to non-scientific knowledge does
not imply discrediting scientific knowledge. What it does imply is using it in
a counter-hegemonic way. This consists, on the one hand, in exploring
alternative scientific practices made visible through plural epistemologies of
scientific practices21 and, on the other, in promoting interdependence between
scientific and non-scientific knowledges.
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The principle of the incomplete nature of all kinds of knowledge is the
condition of the possibility of epistemological dialogue and debate among
them all. What every kind of knowledge brings to such dialogue is the way
in which it manages a certain practice to overcome a certain kind of ignorance.
The confrontation and dialogue among knowledges are confrontation and
dialogue among difference processes through which practices that are
ignorant in different ways turn into practices of knowledge in different
ways. All kinds of knowledge have internal and external limits. The internal
limits are restrictions concerning interventions in the real world.  The external
limits result from the recognition of alternative interventions made possible
by other forms of knowledge. The hegemonic forms of knowledge only
understand the internal limits. The counter-hegemonic usage of modern
science constitutes a parallel exploration of both internal and external limits.
Hence, the counter-hegemonic usage of science cannot be restricted to
science alone; it only makes sense in an ecology of knowledges.
Intercultural Translation
The fourth core idea of an epistemology of the South is intercultural
translation, understood as a procedure that allows for mutual intelligibility
among the experiences of the world, both available and possible. Such a
procedure does not endow any set of experiences with the statute either of
exclusive totality or homogenous part.  At different moments of the work of
translation, the experiences of the world are treated either as totalities or as
parts, as well as realities that do not exhaust themselves in those totalities or
parts. For instance, seeing the subaltern both inside and outside the relation
of subalternity.
According to Banuri (1990), what most affected the South negatively
since the beginning of colonialism was to have concentrated all its energies
in adapting and resisting the impositions of the North.22 Having in mind the
same kind of concern, Serequeberham (1991:22) identifies the two challenges
facing African philosophy today. First, a deconstructive challenge which
consists in identifying the Eurocentric remains inherited from colonialism
and present in the most diverse sectors of collective life, from education to
politics, from law to culture. Second, a reconstructive challenge which
consists in revitalising the historical and cultural possibilities of the African
legacy, interrupted by colonialism and neo-colonialism. The work of
translation aims to capture these two moments: the hegemonic relation among
the experiences and what in the latter (especially the experiences and
resistance of the victims) remains beyond the said relation. In this twofold
movement of social experiences relations of mutual intelligibility emerge
which must not result in the ‘cannibalisation’ of some by others.
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 The work of translation concerns both knowledges and practices (and
their agents). The ‘translation of knowledges’ assumes the form of a
‘diatopical hermeneutics’. This kind of work is what makes the ecology of
knowledges possible. ‘Diatopical hermeneutics’ consists in interpreting two
or more cultures, aiming to identify isomorphic concerns among them and
the different answers they provide. I have proposed an exercise in diatopical
hermeneutics apropos the isomorphic preoccupation regarding human dignity,
bringing together the Western concept of human rights, the Islamic concept
of umma and the Hindu concept of dharma (Santos 1995:333-347; 2002:39-
60).23 Two other exercises of diatopical hermeneutics strike me as important.
The first focuses on the concern for productive life as it is expressed in the
modern capitalist conceptions of development and in Gandhi’s conception
of swadeshi,24 or the indigenous peoples’ conception of Sumak Kawsay. The
capitalist conceptions of development have been reproduced by conventional
economics. They are based on the idea of infinite growth resulting from
gradually subjecting practices and knowledges to the logic of the market.
Swadeshi and Sumak Kawsay, in turn, are based on the idea of sustainability
and reciprocity.
The second exercise of diatopical hermeneutics consists in translating
among various conceptions of wisdom and different visions of the world
and the cosmos. It takes place, for example, between Western philosophy
and the African concept of sagacity.25 The latter underlies the actions of
many African movements and organisations.26 It resides in a critical reflection
on the world that has as its protagonists what Odera Oruka calls sages, be
they poets, traditional healers, storytellers, musicians, or traditional
authorities. According to Odera Oruka, sage philosophy
(…) consists of the expressed thoughts of wise men and women in any
given community and is a way of thinking and explaining the world that
fluctuates between popular wisdom (well known communal maxims,
aphorisms and general commonsense truths) and didactic wisdom, an
expounded wisdom and a rational thought of some given individuals within
a community. While popular wisdom is often conformist, didactic wisdom is
at times critical of the communal set-up and the popular wisdom. Thoughts
can be expressed in writing or as unwritten sayings and argumentations
associated with some individual(s). In traditional Africa, most of what would
pass as sage-philosophy remains unwritten for reasons, which must now
be obvious to everyone. Some of these persons might have been partly
influenced by the inevitable moral and technological culture from the West.
Nevertheless, their own outlook and cultural well-being remain basically
that of traditional rural Africa. Except for a handful of them, the majority of
them are ‘illiterate’ or semi-illiterate (1990:28).
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Diatopical hermeneutics stems from the idea that all cultures are incomplete
and may, therefore, be enriched by engaging in dialogue with or confronting
other cultures. Recognising the relativity of cultures does not necessarily
imply adopting relativism as a philosophical stance. It does imply, however,
conceiving of universalism as a Western particularity whose supremacy as
an idea does not reside in itself, but rather in the supremacy of the interests
that support it. The critique of universalism derives from the critique of a
general theory. On the contrary, diatopical hermeneutics presupposes what
I call negative universalism, the idea of the impossibility of cultural
completeness. In the transition period we traverse, the best formulation for
negative universalism may well be to designate it as a residual general theory:
a general theory on the impossibility of a general theory.
The idea and feeling of want and incompleteness create motivation for
the work of translation which, in order to bear fruit, must be the crossing of
converging motivations with origin in different cultures. The Indian
sociologist Shiv Vishvanathan formulated eloquently the notion of want and
motivation that I here designate as the work of translation. Says Vishvanathan
(2000:12): ‘My problem is, how do I take the best of Indian civilisation and
at the same time keep my modern, democratic imagination alive?’ If we
could imagine an exercise of work of translation conducted by Vishvanathan
and a European or North American intellectual/activist or social movement,
it would be possible to think of the latter's motivation for dialogue formulated
thus: ‘How can I keep alive in me the best of modern and democratic Western
culture, while at the same time recognising the value of the world that it
designated autocratically as non-civilised, ignorant, residual, inferior, or
unproductive?’
The second type of the work of translation is undertaken among social
practices and their agents. All social practices imply knowledge, and as
such they are also knowledge practices. When dealing with practices,
however, the work of translation focuses specifically on mutual intelligibility
among forms of organisation and objectives and styles of action and types
of struggle. What distinguishes the two types of translation work is, after
all, the emphasis or perspective that informs them. The specificity of the
translation work concerning practices and their agents becomes clearer in
situations in which the knowledges that inform different practices are less
distinguishable than the practices themselves. This happens particularly when
the practices take place inside the same cultural universe. Such would be
the case of a work of translation between the forms of organisation and the
objectives of action of two social movements, say, the feminist movement
and the labour movement in a European, Latin American or African country.
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The work of translation aims to clarify what unites and separates the
different movements and practices so as to ascertain the possibilities and
limits of articulation and aggregation among them. Because there is no single
universal social practice or collective subject to confer meaning and direction
to history, the work of translation becomes crucial to define, in each concrete
and historical moment or context, which constellations of subaltern practices
carry more counter-hegemonic potential. For instance, in Mexico, in March
2001, the Zapatista indigenous movement was a privileged counter-hegemonic
practice inasmuch as it was capable of undertaking the work of translation
between its objectives and practices and the objectives and practices of other
Mexican social movements, including the civic and labour movements and
the feminist movement. From that work of translation resulted, for example,
that the Zapatista leader chosen to address the Mexican Congress was a
woman, Comandante Esther. By that choice, the Zapatistas wanted to signify
the articulation between the indigenous movement and the women’s liberation
movement, and thus deepen the counter-hegemonic potential of both.
In recent times, the work of translation has become even more important
as a new counter-hegemonic or anti-systemic movement took shape. This
movement has been calling for an alternative to neoliberal globalisation on
the basis of transnational networks of local movements. It caught the media’s
attention in Seattle in November 1999 and gained its first global organisational
form in the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in January 2001.27 The
movement of counter-hegemonic globalisation reveals the increasing visibility
and diversity of social practices which, in various corners of the globe,
resist neoliberal globalisation. It is a constellation of many and much
diversified movements. On the one hand, there are local movements and
organisations not only very different in their practices and objectives but
also embedded in different cultures. On the other, transnational organisations,
some from the South, some from the North, that also differ widely among
themselves. The articulation and aggregation among all these different
movements and organisations, as well as the creation of cross-border
networks, require a giant work of translation.  What do the participatory
budgeting practised in many Latin American cities, the participatory
democratic planning based on panchayats in Kerala and West Bengal in
India, and the forms of self-government of the indigenous peoples of Latin
America and rural populations in Africa have in common? What can they
learn from one other? In what kinds of counter-hegemonic global activities
can they cooperate? The same questions can be asked about the pacifist and
the anarchist movements, or the indigenous and gay movements, the Zapatista
movement, the ATTAC,28 the Landless Movement in Brazil, and the Narmada
River movement in India, and so on and so forth.
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These are the questions that the work of translation aims to answer. It is
a complex work, not only because the movements and organisations involved
are many and very diverse, but also because they are embedded in diverse
cultures and knowledges. That is to say, the work of translation falls
simultaneously on knowledges and cultures, on the one hand, and on the
practices and agents, on the other. Moreover, this work tends to identify
what unites and separates them. The common points represent the possibility
of an aggregation from bottom up, which is the only alternative to a top-
down aggregation imposed by a general theory or a privileged social actor.
Conclusion
In this article, I have used the concept of public sphere to illustrate the
epistemological and theoretical tasks involved in creating new possibilities
of progressive social transformation aimed at putting an end to the
monumental Eurocentric theoretical justification of the unequal relations
between the global North and the global South. I explored such possibilities
by sketching in rough brush the contours of one or many epistemologies of
the South. Seen from the latter, the public sphere is the tribalism of the
European bourgeoisie at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Both
capitalism and colonialism converted such a localism into a global aspiration
and a universal theoretical concept, at the same time that an abyssal divide
between metropolitan and colonial societies made public sphere unthinkable
in colonial societies and transformed such denial of universality into the
vindication of the universal idea. Unthinking such historical construction
only becomes a credible theoretical task to the extent that theoretical work
positions itself as the facilitating or supporting rearguard of the social
movements and struggles that fight against capitalism and the many
metamorphoses of colonialism.
Notes
1. A Google search on the concept shows more than five million results.
2. I have been working out this concept in empirical research projects conducted
in countries as different as Portugal, Colombia, Brasil, India, Mozambique
and South Africa. Thes projects are part of a much larger project entitled,
‘Reinventing Social Emancipation’ . As a result, four books have been so far
published, Santos (ed.) 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2010.
3. As mentioned below, the modern West does not have a single view of the
world. It has a plurality of views, even if the dominant one has overshadowed
all the others and has become the one that was successfully exported to/
imposed on the ‘rest’ of the world. See Santos, 2009a. As a consequence, the
other views are little known even inside the global North and are not easily
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identified as Western views when evaluated from the perspective of the global
North.
4. See Santos, 2008a.
5. See Habermas, 1987a.
6. See Santos, 2009a.
7. Santos, 2007:45-89.
8. Habermas, 1984, 1987.
9. See Santos, 1995:479-519 and Santos, 2004:157-197.
10. The last attempt to produce a modern critical theory was that of Foucault
focusing on the totalising knowledge of modernity – modern science. Contrary
to current opinion, I consider Foucault a modern, not a postmodern critic.  He
represents the climax and, paradoxically as well, the defeat of critical theory.
Pushing to its ultimate consequences the disciplinary power of the panopticon
construed by modern science, Foucault shows that there is no emancipatory
way out inside this ‘regimen of truth,’ since resistance itself becomes
disciplinary, hence internalised, consented oppression. Foucault’s great merit
was to have shown the opacities and silences produced by modern science,
granting credibility to alternative ‘regimens of truth’, other ways of knowing
that had been marginalised, suppressed and discredited by modern science
(Santos 2004). Foucault contributed immensely to disarming the imperial North
epistemologically, but he was unable to recognise the efforts of the anti-
imperial South to arm itself epistemologically. He was not aware that there
were other knowledges and experiences in question (interview with Boaventura
de Sousa Santos in Tavares 2007:133).
11. On these authors, see Santos, 2009a.
12. Actually, the system of reappropriation works both ways. For the past 20
years, we have witnessed the World Bank’s appropriation of watchwords of
critical theory, such as participatory democracy and participation in general.
13. Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas (Free Trade Area of the Americas).
14. Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas (Bolivarian Alternative for the
Americas).
15. There is also a global North in countries of the South, consisting of the local
elites that take advantage of the production and reproduction capitalism and
colonialism. This is what I call the imperial South.
16. On the epistemology of the South, see Santos, 2006a; 2006b; 2008b and
2009b. See also Santos and Meneses (eds.), 2009.
17. See Santos, 2004:157-197.
18. Quijano considers the racialisation of power relations as an intrinsic feature
of capitalism, a feature that he designates as the ‘coloniality of power’
(2000:374).
19. On this topic, see Santos, 2007:45-89; 2008a; 2009c:509-541.
20. Santos, 1995:25; 2005a; 2007; 2008b.
21. See Santos (ed.), 2007.
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22. Banuri argues that the capitalist and colonial project for the development of
the South was negative for the South, ‘not because of bad advice or evil
intention on the part of the councillors or consultants of development ... but
because the project constantly forced the colonial populations  to separate
their energies of positive search from a social change defined by themselves
and focus on the negative objective of resisting the cultural, political and
economic domination of the West’ (italics in the original) (Banuri 1990:66).
23. On the concept of umma, see above all, Faruki, 1979; An Na’im, 1995, 2000;
Hassan, 1996; on the concept of  dharma, see Gandhi, 1929/32; Zaehner, 1982.
24. See Gandhi, 1941, 1967. On swadeshi see also, among others, Bipinchandra,
1954; Nandy, 1987; Krishna, 1994.
25 Similar conceptions may be found, for instance, among the indigenous peoples.
26. On sage philosophy see Oruka (1990, 1998) and also Oseghare, 1992;
Presbey, 1997.
27. On counter-hegemonic globalization, there is a bibliography on the rise. See,
among others, Santos, 1995:250-377; 2002 (ed.); 2006b; Keck y Sikkink, 1998;
Evans, 1999; Brecher et al. 2000; Cohen and Rai, 2000.
28. Acronyme of Association pour la Taxation des Transactions Financières
pour l’Aide  aux Citoyens.
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